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I.

INTRODUCTION

Statutes and regulations endeavor to direct behavior
throughout society and allow injured individuals to recover for
harm. However, the enactment of a particular law—or the absence
thereof—can have other unintended consequences. What facially
appears to facilitate resolution can, in practice, actually construct
hurdles that inhibit this very goal. This paradox is especially
prevalent in laws affecting the elder population in need of longterm care services, such as in a nursing home, assisted living, or
other long-term care setting.
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Older adults in long-term care facilities need legal services just
like any other subset of our population but have a unique set of
needs. When injuries occur in the long-term care setting, the older
adult or a family member may seek accountability. Yet, they often
lack the financial means or energy to bring a legal claim. A nursing
home resident is not focused on enforcing his or her rights or
suing the very company providing him or her with necessary care.
The resident is often either unaware of a potential legal claim or is
unable to contact an attorney, let alone retain one. Even if a claim
is pursued, the current legal framework limits recovery and
accountability for older victims. Without the ability to meaningfully
pursue their legal claims, society sends the wrong message to older
adults—essentially stripping them of voice under the current legal
framework. Legal claims on behalf of the elder population range
anywhere from breach of contract, retaliatory discharge, and
medical malpractice, to violation of rights. This article explores the
claim of medical malpractice, in particular, and highlights the
barriers older adults encounter under Minnesota law in trying to
resolve their claims. It concludes by offering some proposed
changes to improve the legal landscape for our elder population.
II. BACKGROUND
The number of individuals age sixty-five and older is on the
rise due to the fact that baby boomers—those born from 1946 to
1964—started to turn sixty-five in 2011. From 2000 to 2010, the
1
number of Americans age sixty-five and over increased by 15.1%.
Among those ages sixty-five and over, the number of males age
eighty-five and older increased by 46.5%, more than any other
2
demographic. In Minnesota, the number of people age sixty-five
and older is expected to almost double between the years 2010 and
2030. In 2025, for the first time ever, the population in Minnesota
of people age sixty-five and older is expected to exceed the
3
population of children age five to seventeen for the first time ever.

1. CARRIE A. WERNER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE OLDER POPULATION: 2010, at
1 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-09.pdf.
2. Id. at 4.
3. Aging Overview, MINN. COMPASS, http://www.mncompass.org/aging
/overview (last visited May 8, 2016).
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Given the recent increase in the older population, it comes as
4
no surprise that the number of those needing long-term care
5
services is also on the rise. However, the increase is reflected in the
assisted living facilities and smaller group home models, while the
6
number of individuals in nursing homes has actually decreased.
The percentage of the population age sixty-five and older in
7
nursing homes was 5.1% in 1990, 4.5% in 2000, and 3.1% in 2010.
Nationwide in 2010, 1.5 million people were residents of a nursing
8
9
home, with 1.2 million age sixty-five and older and 74% female. In
Minnesota, the number of nursing home beds has actually
10
decreased by 32% since 1975, from 45,448 to 31,190. Minnesota
11
has had a moratorium on building new nursing homes for
approximately the last thirty years, reflecting a public policy of
encouraging people to stay in their homes.
The decrease in nursing home beds, coupled with an increase
in the number of people needing long-term services, means an
increase in other services. As a result, assisted living and smaller
residential care homes have seen a large population increase. In
Minnesota, unlike other states, assisted living facilities are not
12
licensed. Rather, the landlord registers the building as a “housing
4. For the purposes of this article, “long-term care” references nursing
homes, assisted living facilities, group homes, or other multiple-resident facilities
in which individuals receive home care services.
5. See WERNER, supra note 1, at 18.
6. For the purposes of this article, “nursing home” references facilities
licensed by the Minnesota Department of Health as a nursing home, including a
“skilled nursing facility” under 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3, referring to facilities accepting
Medicare funding; a “nursing facility” under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, referring to
facilities accepting Medicaid funding, and facilities licensed as Boarding Care
Homes by the Minnesota Department of Health. See MINN. STAT. § 144.50 (2014).
7. Compare WERNER, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.7, with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE
65 YEARS AND OVER POPULATION: 2000, at 7–8 tbl.8 (2001), https://www.census.gov
/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-10.pdf.
8. It is worth noting that 300,000 nursing home residents were under age
sixty-five. See WERNER, supra note 1, at 18.
9. See id.
10. As of March 24, 2015, the Minnesota Department of Health licensed
approximately 374 nursing homes and twenty-six boarding care homes for a
combined total of 31,190 beds. MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2015 DIRECTORY: LICENSED,
CERTIFIED AND REGISTERED HEALTH CARE FACILITIES AND SERVICES I (2015),
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/fpc/directory/2015mdhdirectory.pdf.
11. See MINN. STAT. § 144A.71.
12. See NAT’L CTR. FOR ASSISTED LIVING, ASSISTED LIVING STATE REGULATORY
REVIEW 2013, at 102 (2013) [hereinafter ASSISTED LIVING REVIEW 2013], https://
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with services” (HWS) unit, and a home care service entity comes in
to provide services. A HWS registration notifies the public that the
facility is serving the elderly, disabled, and vulnerable populations
and includes assisted living settings, group homes, and facilities in
which residents receive some type of home care service. As of
March 2015, approximately 2225 HWS registrations were issued by
13
the Minnesota Department of Health. These registrations are up
14
55% from March 2009, when 1434 HWS registrations were issued.
In addition, the number of home care providers licensed in
15
Minnesota grew from 1369 in 2009 to 1629 in 2015. This shift to
HWS and home care is significant, especially in Minnesota, because
the consumer and resident must be aware that even though the
assisted living facility or similar entity appears to be a 24/7 care
model, such as in a nursing home, it is not. All “non-nursing
homes” are bound by a landlord/tenant agreement with home care
services coming into the HWS-registered building.
The ramification of this flexible and broad long-term care
arrangement is that coordination of care may be lacking, which
creates a greater risk of residents falling through the cracks of the
system and suffering injury or harm. The regulations and laws
surrounding home care—while significantly strengthened in recent
16
years in Minnesota —lack the clarity necessary to hold facilities
accountable for such harm.
Another significant consideration related to long-term care for
the elderly is the expected rise in mental health diagnoses.
Currently, one in four older adults experiences a mental disorder
www.ahcancal.org/ncal/resources/Documents/2013_reg_review.pdf.
13. MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 10, at I.
14. Compare LYNN AVES ET AL., MINN. HOUSE RESEARCH DEP’T, REGULATION OF
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVICES
FACILITIES
9
(2010),
http://
www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/hhsfacl.pdf (noting that HWS licenses
totaled 1434 in 2009), with MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 10, at I tbl.2 (listing
HWS licensures as 2225 in 2015).
15. Compare AVES ET AL., supra note 14, at 16 (noting the numbers of home
care licensure classes A, B, C, and F, which add up to 1369 in 2009), with MINN.
DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 10, at I tbl.1 (listing home care licensures as 1629 in
2015). Note that the system of home care licensure changed significantly in the
2013 legislative session, changing home care licensures from distinctions of A, B,
C, and F to “basic” and “comprehensive” home care licenses, thus diminishing
some ability to compare the number of licenses in 2009 to 2015. See Act of May 23,
2013, ch. 108, 2013 Minn. Laws 335, 335–73 (as codified at MINN. STAT. §§
144A.471–.483).
16. See 2013 Minn. Laws at 335–73.
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such as depression, anxiety, or dementia, and an estimated twothirds of older adults with mental health diagnoses do not receive
17
necessary treatment. The number of older adults with mental
18
health diagnoses is expected to double to 15 million by 2030. In
Minnesota, the number of individuals age sixty-five and older with
Alzheimer’s disease, the most common form of dementia, is
expected to rise 34.8% from 2015 to 2025—from 89,000 to
19
120,000.
With the increase in the number of older adults needing longterm care services and the increase in diagnoses such as
20
Alzheimer’s, comes greater vulnerability for residents. With
greater vulnerability comes greater potential for harm and injury.
Laws and regulations exist for protection from such harms, such as
the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA ‘87),
21
which established regulations for nursing homes. While it is
arguable that such regulations apply to assisted living and other
long-term care models in Minnesota, the law does not present clear
standards by which breaches of the standard of care can be
22
measured in the home care setting. When accountability for such
harm is pursued, whether in the nursing home or home care
model, the law provides barriers to resolution that diminish the
voice of the older population.
III. ISSUES
A majority of long-term care providers in Minnesota are
performing great services to the older population. They face
adverse circumstances yet strive daily to meet the needs of
17. Healthy Aging Fact Sheet, NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING, https://www.ncoa.org
/wp-content/uploads/FactSheet_HealthyAging.pdf (last updated Jan. 2014).
18. Id.
19. 2015 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, http://
www.alz.org/facts/downloads/facts_figures_2015.pdf (last visited May 8, 2016).
20. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LONG-TERM CARE
PROVIDERS AND SERVICES USERS IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE NATIONAL
STUDY OF LONG-TERM CARE PROVIDERS, 2013–2014, at 40 (2016), http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_03/sr03_038.pdf (documenting Alzheimer’s
disease incidence across care settings).
21. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1330 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(4),
1396(b)(4)); 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2015). See generally 42 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2012); id.
§ 1302.
22. See generally MINN. STAT. ch. 144A (2014).
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residents. Innovative ideas in long-term care continue to be
pursued to reduce risk of harm and to improve services. However,
injuries and death still occur. Based on this author’s experience in
bringing medical malpractice claims against long-term care
facilities, most injuries in long-term care facilities center on four
main themes: (1) lack of training; (2) lack of equipment; (3) lack
of staffing; and (4) lack of coordination of care. Common injuries
include falls, pressure sores, infections, and medication errors. Less
common, but on the rise, are assault (including sexual assault),
abuse, and drug diversion via taking of the elders’ medication. The
ramifications of injury in a vulnerable population have a spiral
effect. The resident who falls and experiences a hip fracture at age
eighty-five or ninety may never walk again because he or she is not
a candidate for surgery and is unable to regain strength to fully
heal. An unchecked pressure sore on the feet can lead to gangrene
and amputation, particularly for someone with peripheral vascular
complications. Knowledge of the preexisting conditions do not
excuse poor care but rather allow for increased notice to provide
good care to account for the risk factors present.
Today, many providers split out their approach to care,
particularly with the home care model. The home care provider
that is a main presence at the facility or at home often performs the
23
activities of daily living but not skilled care, such as wound care. A
wound care provider comes in specifically to treat the wound but
24
not to provide other services, even in nursing homes at times. A
hospice team often comes in separately from the nursing home or
25
home care staff. The resident already likely has a doctor who
makes quarterly (or sometimes monthly) rounds and a nurse
practitioner that may see the resident monthly. Fractionated care
often means that a particular care issue gets lost in the shuffle and
the resident suffers. No sole provider or care facility sees
themselves as having the responsibility to follow through on

23. See generally ASSISTED LIVING REVIEW 2013, supra note 12.
24. For more information on wound care, see Publications, JEFFREY M. LEVINE,
http://jmlevinemd.com/publications (last visited May 8, 2016); Educational and
Clinical Resources, NAT’L PRESSURE ULCER ADVISORY PANEL, http://www.npuap.org
/resources/educational-and-clinical-resources/ (last visited May 8, 2016).
25. See, e.g., Matthew E. Misichko, A Help-Ing Hand: How Legislation Can
Reform the Affordable Care Act and Hospice Care to Prioritize Comfort and Prepare for the
Baby Boomer Generation, 21 ELDER L.J. 419, 431–32 (2014) (noting the
congressionally intended separateness of hospice care from nursing home care).
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ensuring that a condition is not worsening or reporting changes in
condition. Changes in condition present one of the greatest
challenges for providers. Under 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(b)(11)(i), the
provider has the duty to notify a resident’s physician and family
26
member about any changes in condition. This one duty becomes
extremely challenging with multiple providers involved in care, yet
the duty remains and the resident relies on the facility to intervene
when harm arises.
Regardless of how and why injury or death occurred, the law
allows older adults, just like their younger counterparts, to seek
redress through the courts. Theoretically, the older adult could
bring a claim of medical malpractice and seek damages for injury
as a result of a breach of standard of care. The older adult has the
time, resources, and capacity to hire an attorney to seek
compensation. Theoretically, the injury could be isolated to the
particular breach and experts could testify as to what medical
conditions are related to the injury. The courthouse doors provide
equal opportunity to older adults to work through the process to
resolve the matter. Theoretically, the family members left behind
after a death are able to pursue the claim on behalf of their loved
one, including getting medical records to investigate the harm
done. Theoretically, the claim moves swiftly to resolution prior to
the death of an older plaintiff. However, the human dynamic of
medical malpractice claims on behalf of the elderly against longterm care providers is not confined to theory. In the real world, the
voice of the elder is squeezed out by the practical implications of
the law.
There are many practical barriers in medical malpractice
claims brought by older adults against long-term care facilities.
These barriers can be insurmountable in some cases, or more
minor in others. But they nevertheless impede resolution in a
manner not experienced by other age or ability groups. Legislators
did not contemplate the impact of such laws on the older
population, and that by highlighting these barriers, improvements
can eventually be made in valuing the voice of the older population
in the face of harm. Delay in medical malpractice claims on behalf
of the elderly or vulnerable adults is extremely troubling given that
if the elder dies, pain and suffering damages do not survive the
decedent. This sends the wrong message to long-term care
26.

42 C.F.R. § 483.10(b)(11).
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providers—that even if the resident dies in the face of egregious
negligence, the claim will most likely go away.
Below are some of the barriers experienced by the older
population when bringing a medical malpractice claim:
A.

Providers Challenging Health Care Agent
Providers challenging that a health care agent has authority
under a health care directive to make decisions as to care and at
times to retrieve medical records, based on the principal lacking
decision-making capacity.

Minnesota Statutes chapter 145C sets forth the requirements
27
for executing a health care directive in Minnesota. In other
28
states, a health care directive is also called an advanced care
29
30
31
directive, health care power of attorney, or living will. The
general idea is to formalize an individual’s wishes for care and/or
to appoint a health care agent to make health care decisions for
the individual. A health care directive may list both health care
instructions, as well as appoint a health care agent, but need only
32
do one of the two.
Under Minnesota’s health care directive statute, in order for
the agency appointment (or any instructions for that matter) to
“vest,” or become valid, the principal must lack decision-making

27. See MINN. STAT. ch. 145C.
28. Minnesota Statutes chapter 145C and the language of “health care
directive” replaces Minnesota Statutes chapter 145B, which used the old language
of a “living will.” Compare MINN. STAT. ch. 145C, with MINN. STAT. ch. 145B.
Although Minnesota Statutes chapter 145B still exists on the books, it applies only
to living wills executed before August 1, 1998. See MINN. STAT. § 145B.011.
29. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg., 1st Spec.,
and 2d Spec. Sess.); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4701 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess. and ch. 1 of 2015-2016 2d Ex. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of Gen. Assemb.); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5422 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1-96); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.002 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th
Leg.).
30. E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501(2)(j) (McKinney, Westlaw through
2016).
31. E.g. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-495
of the 2015 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act
127).
32. MINN. STAT. § 145C.03, subdiv. 1(6).
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33

capacity. This means that before a health care provider may
honor the agent’s wishes or in some circumstances provide the
agent with medical records, the provider may first determine
whether the principal can make health care decisions on his or her
34
own. With all the emphasis on having a health care directive on
file with the provider, most of the time the health care provider will
simply honor the authority given in the directive and is glad to be
able to talk with someone in authority to facilitate decisions.
However, based on Minnesota law, the provider may challenge
whether the grant of authority has officially been made by
requiring a finding that the principal lacks decision-making
35
capacity. Minnesota Statutes section 145C.01, subdivision 1(b)
defines decision-making capacity as: “[T]he ability to understand
the significant benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health
36
care and to make and communicate a health care decision.”
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 145C.02, the
determination of decision-making capacity is to be made by the
37
principal’s attending physician :
A principal with the capacity to do so may execute a
health care directive. A health care directive may include
one or more health care instructions to direct health care
providers, others assisting with health care, family
members, and a health care agent. A health care directive
may include a health care power of attorney to appoint a
health care agent to make health care decisions for the
principal when the principal, in the judgment of the
principal’s attending physician, lacks decision-making
capacity, unless otherwise specified in the health care
38
directive.
The provider may challenge that the health care directive is
valid when he or she legitimately becomes concerned about

33. Id. §§ 145C.01, subdiv. 1b, 145C.02, 145C.06.
34. See id. § 145C.08.
35. See id. § 145C.06.
36. Id. § 145C.01, subdiv. 1(b).
37. Minnesota Statutes chapter 145C does not define the term “attending
physician”; however, it is presumed to mean the treating and/or primary care
physician. Compare id. § 145C.01, with id. § 145C.07, subdiv. 1, and id. § 145C.06.
Additionally, an “attending physician” may not act as a health care agent if the
physician is attending to the principal on the date of the execution of the health
care directive. Id. § 145C.03, subdiv. 2(b)(1).
38. Id. § 145C.02.
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listening to the agent when the principal can adequately
understand and communicate his or her wishes. However, the
provider may also use this required finding of decision-making
capacity to manipulate a result. For instance, when the provider
disagrees with the agent’s decisions regarding the principal’s
health, the provider may state that it will not honor the health care
directive because the principal can speak for himself or herself,
thus blocking the influence and instructions of the agent. This
blocking can happen in the nursing home setting when the agent
wants to send the principal to the hospital (or does not want to),
and the provider believes otherwise.
One part of the health care directive is often authorizing the
39
agent to receive medical records. In fact, drafters of a health care
directive should specifically include language that appoints the
agent as a “personal representative” under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), authorizing
the agent to receive medical records (otherwise known as
“protected health information”). If an injury occurs in a nursing
home and the agent wishes to investigate the matter by reviewing
medical records, the agent may be blocked from receiving medical
records pending a determination by a physician that the resident
40
lacks the requisite decision-making capacity. As a further potential
hurdle in the process, the resident likely utilizes the physician
associated with the nursing home as a primary care and treating
physician, so the possibility exists that the physician may simply say
that the principal lacks decision-making capacity. Not to mention,
the physician may visit once every three months and thereby delay
getting an opinion on the principal’s decision-making capacity.
Nothing in Minnesota Statutes chapter 145C precludes the
agent from adding other wishes to the document, thus adding to or

39. Id. § 145C.08.
40. This author has experienced this delay in obtaining records, with the
nursing home stating that because the resident moved to another facility, the
facility could not honor the agent/claimant’s request for medical records because
it could not evaluate the former resident’s current condition to determine if he or
she lacked decision-making capacity, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes chapter
145C. The provider was willing to accept the written opinion of the former
resident’s current physician as to decision-making capacity, but the process caused
considerable delay. Delay is the nemesis of elder medical malpractice claims in
Minnesota, given that if the resident dies, pain and suffering damages do not
survive the decedent.
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41

amending statutory language. In fact, Minnesota Statutes section
145C.02 specifically states that the agent is appointed when the
attending physician determines that the principal lacks decisionmaking capacity, “unless otherwise specified in the health care
42
directive.” Minnesota Statutes section 145C.05, subdivision 2(c)
even more clearly states that “[a] health care directive may
authorize a health care agent to make health care decisions for a
principal even though the principal retains decision-making
43
capacity.”
Therefore, to avoid the above delays, the drafter of the health
care directive should: (1) ensure that HIPAA language is in the
directive to allow for retrieval of medical records; (2) ensure that
language for retrieval of medical records states that the agent has
authority to do so, regardless of decision-making capacity; and (3)
ensure that language regarding the appointment of the agent
includes that an agent is appointed, regardless of decision-making
44
capacity. While perhaps not foolproof in eliminating inquiry into
whether the appointment has occurred, it may reduce hurdles in
recognizing the grant of authority in the health care directive.
B.

Interpretation by Providers Concerning Medical Records Access
The interpretation by health care providers that once a person
dies, the authority granted under the health care directive to
retrieve medical records ceases.

When a loved one dies, the family naturally seeks answers.
They want to know what happened, how their loved one died, and
who may have been present or involved. This is particularly so in a
long-term care setting when the expectation is that the resident is
in the nursing home or assisted living facility specifically for the
purpose of preventing injury or death by getting around the clock
care. Some facilities will meet with the family and attempt to
explain as best they can what happened. However, other facilities
41. See MINN. STAT. § 145C.05.
42. Id. § 145C.02.
43. Id. § 145C.05, subdiv. 2(c).
44. Note that under some circumstances the health care directive should not
include language by which the agent can act even if the resident has decisionmaking capacity, such as to prevent family members from making health care
decisions that do not promote the best interests of the resident (based on the
wishes of the resident).
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will block information requests. This is particularly disadvantageous
for bringing a medical malpractice claim since the plaintiff must
seek review of medical records by a qualified provider who
45
determines that negligence occurred prior to filing suit. If the
family is not able to get the medical records, they cannot get the
46
requisite review to bring a claim.
If the decedent had a health care directive allowing an agent
to receive medical records, the provider will state that the ability for
another to get medical records through the directive ceased upon
death. However, that is not entirely true. Minnesota’s health care
directive statute does not specifically address whether the authority
47
granted under the directive ceases upon death. It certainly does
not state that the health care directive ceases upon death, and in
fact provides evidence that it is contemplated that the directive
would continue after death. Minnesota Statutes section 145C.05,
subdivisions 2(a)(5) and (7), suggest that the health care directive
include instructions related to anatomical gifts and funeral
48
directives, both of which would need to be carried out after death.
The following authority specifically allows a health care
directive to continue to be effective even after death.
1.

Family Member if Government Entity

Medical records from a government hospital or entity are
made available to the surviving spouse, parents, children, siblings,
and health care agent of the decedent pursuant to Minnesota
49
Statutes section 13.384, subdivision 3(e).
2.

Surviving Spouse, Parents, and Representative

Minnesota Statutes section 144.291, subdivision 2(g), defines a
“patient” as the individual receiving treatment as well as the
50
surviving spouse, parents, and representative of the individual.

45. Minnesota Statutes section 145.682, subdivision 2 requires expert
opinions in civil claims against a medical provider that allege a breach of the
standard of medical care.
46. See id.
47. See id. § 145C.02.
48. Id. § 145C.05, subdivs. 2(a)(5), (7).
49. Id. § 13.384, subdiv. 3(e).
50. Id. § 144.291, subdiv. 2(g).
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Minnesota Statutes section 144.292, subdivision 5, states that the
51
patient must be given a copy of his or her medical records.
3.

Personal Representative Appointed Via a Will

Even absent the formal appointment of the personal
representative of an estate, a provider must also provide protected
health information to a person appointed as personal
representative in a will. This right to medical records of a decedent
is generally recognized in Minnesota due to the personal
representative being specifically allowed access to medical records
52
under Minnesota Statutes section 144.293, subdivision 2.
4.

Personal Representative of the Estate of the Deceased Individual

Under federal law, the provider must disclose protected health
information, upon request, to the personal representative of the
53
estate of the decedent. In this case, the personal representative
stands in the shoes of the decedent in making the request, as if the
54
deceased individual made the request.
5.

Family Members Involved in the Care of Decedent Prior to Death

Effective March 26, 2013, the HIPAA/HITECH Act Omnibus
55
Final Rules went into effect, making several clarifications to what
56
is known at the “Privacy Rule” under 45 C.F.R. § 164. The Privacy
Rule contains language that regulates the dissemination of
57
protected health information. As one of the clarifications of the
2013 Omnibus Rule, providers are to disclose the protected health
information of a decedent to family members and others who were
involved in the care or payment for care of the decedent, prior to
58
death. The term “involved in care” is defined as the provider

51. Id. § 144.292, subdiv. 5.
52. Id. § 144.293, subdiv. 2.
53. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(4) (2015).
54. Id. § 164.502(g)(1).
55. See Modifications to HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566-01 (Jan. 25, 2013).
56. 45 C.F.R. § 164.
57. See id. § 160.103 (defining “protected health information”).
58. The Code of Federal Regulations provides:
If the individual is deceased, a covered entity may disclose to a family
member, or other persons identified in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section who were involved in the individual’s care or payment for
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having “reasonable assurance” that the family member was involved
59
in the decedent’s care. However, the provider is not required to
supply the requested information if the provider believes that
60
disclosure is not appropriate; rather disclosure is permitted.
C.

Legal Authority to Get Decendent’s Medical Records
If the provider will not recognize the legal authority to get medical
records of a decedent, a trustee must be appointed to get medical
records.

Even though the family should be able to get medical records
on behalf of a decedent based on the aforementioned provisions
listed in this article, the provider may yet resist disclosure of the
medical records. Particularly with the newer Privacy Rule,
disclosure of medical records to a family member who was involved
with the decedent’s care prior to death is allowed but not
61
required. At times, providers seem to utilize HIPAA privacy rules
as a sword and not a shield when preventing disclosure of medical
records in follow-up to an injury or death of a vulnerable adult.
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 573.02, subdivision 3, a
trustee must be appointed to bring a legal claim of wrongful death,
or of personal injury where the decedent’s death is unrelated to the
62
injury. Being appointed as a trustee is distinct from being
appointed as a personal representative of an estate. The authority
of the trustee is generally recognized by providers as allowing
63
disclosure of medical records. However, it comes at a cost, both
monetarily and—at times—personally, to even get the records for
64
review of a possible injury or death claim.

health care prior to the individual’s death, protected health
information of the individual that is relevant to such person’s
involvement, unless doing so is inconsistent with any prior expressed
preference of the individual that is known to the covered entity.
Id. § 164.510(b)(5).
59. Id. § 164.510(b)(1); see Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 55, at
5615.
60. See Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 55, at 5615–16.
61. Id.
62. MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 3 (2014).
63. See Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 55, at 5615.
64. See supra Section III.C; infra Section III.D.
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Rejection of Authorization for Release of Medical Information
The provider’s rejection of an authorization for release of medical
information must meet the elements of compliance under federal
law.

Under federal HIPAA regulations regarding the disclosure of
protected health information, an authorization to release
65
information must contain certain statements and information.
Persons seeking to receive information need not use the provider’s
own authorization. Instead, they can use an authorization that is in
compliance with HIPAA regulations. The patient, by and through
any designated third party, has a right of access to his or her
66
protected health information. Furthermore, the provider is to
67
supply the requested information within thirty days. While the
authorization and right of access may be enforced through an
administrative complaint through the Office of Civil Rights, such
68
delay may prove costly to the elderly claimant.
E.

Appointment of Trustee Process Is Not Conducive to Elder Client
The appointment of trustee process itself is not conducive to the
elder client.

As stated above, Minnesota Statutes section 573.02 dictates that
a trustee be appointed to bring a wrongful death or personal injury
69
claim on behalf of a decedent. In other states, the personal
representative of the estate of the decedent is authorized to bring
the wrongful death or injury claim but not in Minnesota.
Minnesota has a unique process of appointing a “trustee for the
70
next of kin.” The process of trustee appointment is explained in
the Minnesota General Rules of Practice, Rule 144.01, but the rule
was not designed with elder decedents in mind, causing additional

65. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)–(c) (2015).
66. See id. § 164.524(a).
67. Id. § 164.524(b)(2)(i).
68. See generally HIPAA What to Expect, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/complaints/index.html (last visited May
8, 2016).
69. See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 3 (2014).
70. See Ortiz v. Gavenda, 590 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn. 1999).
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hurdles to bringing such a claim likely not intended under the
71
law.
First, the trustee appointment requires notification to the next
of kin of the decedent, defined as the living spouse, parents,
72
children, grandparents, and siblings of the decedent. When the
elder client is often age seventy-five or higher, notifying the siblings
of the decedent can pose a problem. Oftentimes those siblings are
in nursing homes or advanced in years themselves, with little
connection to the decedent at this phase in life. Knowing their
current contact information is the first challenge. Getting a
signature for any consent to an appointment of trustee poses
another challenge, given that the person may not have an attorneyin-fact appointed to sign documents and the elderly sibling may not
be able to sign themselves. Generally, if all next of kin consent to
the appointment, the court will appoint the trustee without a
73
hearing. However, a hearing may be necessary if consent is
unobtainable due to the advanced age of a sibling, which further
adds to the expense of appointing a trustee. Remember that the
appointment may be sought to simply get authority to receive and
review medical records for the possibility that a claim may be
brought. More often than not, the siblings want nothing to do with
the legal claim and appointment of trustee, but the law requires
that the trustee represent the elderly sibling.
Second, if a claim is brought by the trustee, any settlement or
award must be disclosed to the next of kin to allow them to consent
to the distribution and/or have an opportunity to be heard in a
court hearing. Given that most of the time the siblings are
uninvolved with the decedent, it is often reasonable for them to
receive no recovery. However, the trustee runs the risk that a
sibling—if able—may object to little to no recovery and thus
change expectations of the next of kin as to recovery. For example,
usually the children are bringing the claim and divide any award
amongst themselves, given the lack of connection of the decedent
to his or her siblings at that time.
Finally, in an older resident, second marriages, adopted, or
long-lost children are not uncommon. In one case, the decedent
had long ago ceased contact with his biological children for several

71.
72.
73.

MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 144.01.
Id. R. 144.01.
Id. R. 144.02.
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reasons, yet the stepfather of the children did not adopt them. The
children were difficult to locate and the process brought about
many painful memories regarding a father they never really knew
who was now tragically dead as a result of an incident in a nursing
home. Determining who are the next of kin is a process in and of
itself that is quite complex given decades’ worth of family dynamics.
Again, the risk is not simply in getting a trustee appointment but
also in agreement as to any distribution. Families in conflict over
distribution due to dredging up past painful memories diverts the
attention from the true focus of the trustee and wrongful death
process—standing in the shoes of the decedent to seek
accountability for a breach of standard of care, not punishing the
family for past disagreements.
F.

Pain and Suffering Damages in Minnesota
There are no pain and suffering damages in Minnesota once the
resident dies, which sends the wrong message to providers of longterm care.

Under current Minnesota law, the greatest disadvantage to
elder clients is that there is no meaningful way to account for injury
once the client dies—namely because, under Minnesota law, the
74
pain and suffering of the decedent does not survive. Thus, one of
the main measures of damages for the client dies with him or her.
While death due to negligence is always tragic, pain and suffering
damages may not be missed as sorely as in a claim involving a
younger plaintiff. Unlike younger, employed plaintiffs, the elder
client is not employed at the time of injury and cannot collect lost
wages, loss of earning capacity, or often future medical costs.
Available damages in a wrongful death claim involving a nursing
home resident, for instance, are generally the medical bills; funeral
bills; and the loss of aid, comfort, and society to family members
75
left behind. The pool of damages is not that large to begin with
74. Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 351–52, 113 N.W.2d 355, 358 (1961)
(ruling that damages in a wrongful death action are for pecuniary loss and not for
pain and suffering); Bremer v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 96 Minn.
469, 470, 105 N.W. 494, 494 (1905) (quoting Hutchins v. St. Paul, Minneapolis &
Manitoba Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 5, 9, 46 N.W. 79 (1890)) (noting that damages cannot
be awarded for pain and suffering).
75. See, e.g., Martz v. Revier, 284 Minn. 166, 170 N.W.2d 83 (1969); Andert,
261 Minn. at 351–52, 113 N.W.2d at 358.
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for a claim brought by the family of the resident. Even if future
medical bills were able to be determined, given the multiple
diagnoses and conditions suffered by the resident, the shorter
anticipated life span would limit any future damages significantly.
In addition, valuation of the loss of aid, comfort, and society of the
next of kin does not make sense when the elder resident is at the
time of life when family members give to the resident, not the
other way around. While the loss of any loved one, no matter the
age, is devastating, the law contemplates loss and calculates
damages based on the middle-aged father of three and not the
eighty-five-year-old great-grandmother.
Perhaps the most significant effect of not allowing pain and
suffering damages to survive the decedent is that without other
meaningful damages available to the injured elder, providers of
long-term care have little incentive to resolve claims. They may
simply delay the claim until the person dies and the claim
76
essentially goes away. Only special damages are available in an
injury claim where the decedent died of causes unrelated to the
injury. If the resident experienced abuse or neglect, yet did not
receive medical treatment or incur medical bills, Minnesota
Statutes section 573.01 states:
A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person
dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists,
except as provided in section 573.02. All other causes of
action by one against another, whether arising on
contract or not, survive to the personal representatives of
77
the former and against those of the latter.
The exception referenced in the above statute is for the
78
wrongful death of the decedent and personal injury where the
79
death was from causes unrelated to the injury. Even under an
injury claim with a death from unrelated causes pursuant to section
573.02, subdivision 2, the only available damages are special
80
damages for the injury, not pain and suffering. For the wrongful
death claim, the available damages are pecuniary damages under

76. Special damages are generally considered “economic damages” such as
medical and funeral bills. See Range v. Buskirk Constr. Co., 281 Minn. 312, 318,
161 N.W.2d 645, 649 (1968).
77. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2014).
78. Id. § 573.02, subdiv. 1.
79. Id. § 573.01, subdiv. 2.
80. Id.
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81

subdivision 1. Pecuniary damages do not include the pain and
82
suffering of the decedent under Minnesota law. All other causes
of action related to injury die with the decedent.
G.

Expedited Litigation and Risk of Death Affects Available Damages
A greater need for expedited litigation and a higher risk that the
elder resident will die during the pendency of the claim
significantly affects available damages.

As previously discussed, there is little incentive for a provider
to mediate or otherwise work efficiently to resolve an injury claim
when the available damages change significantly upon death with
the inability to recover for pain and suffering. However, if the
parties cannot resolve the matter swiftly, at minimum, all courts
should accommodate an expedited litigation process to keep the
claim moving forward in a timely manner given the inherent
disadvantage the elderly client faces. Yet, expedited litigation is not
formally recognized in Minnesota courts for a medical malpractice
case. The court system is currently piloting a mandatory expedited
litigation track in Dakota and St. Louis County District Courts for
83
certain civil claims but not medical malpractice.
H. Mediation May Not Be Ordered by a Judge
When the court does not order the parties to mediation, it
works another significant disadvantage on elderly clients. Courts
generally favor ordering the parties to mediation prior to going to
trial to see if the parties can resolve the matter. In medical
malpractice cases, the court is to require the parties to discuss
whether the parties may agree upon alternative dispute
81. Id. § 573.02, subdiv. 1.
82. See Skifstrom v. City of Coon Rapids, 524 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (explaining the difference between general damages and pecuniary
damages).
83. See MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, SPECIAL RULES FOR THE PILOT EXPEDITED CIVIL
LITIGATION
TRACK,
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Rules
/Special_Rules_for_Pilot_ELT.pdf (last visited May 8, 2016). Arguably injury
claims against a nursing home, assisted living facility, and home health care
provider are considered medical malpractice claims pursuant to Minnesota
Statutes section 145.61. However, some injuries—such as abuse and neglect—have
common-law injury standards and, at a minimum, those claims should be made
available to expedited litigation tracks as currently defined by the courts.
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resolution. At times the court may not order mediation or
another form of alternative dispute resolution unless the parties all
85
agree to such a proceeding. Not ordering mediation is a great
disservice to the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case involving an
elderly claimant. The finite pool of damages, the impact on
damages if a death occurs, and the distinction between medical
malpractice in long-term care versus acute care settings all force
parties into expensive and drawn out litigation. This effect runs
afoul of public policies protecting vulnerable adults elsewhere in
the law.
In addition, providers often try to force plaintiffs to alternative
dispute resolution while not agreeing to the same at a plaintiff’s
request, revealing a disparity in power and unconscionable
procedures. For instance, many binding, mandatory arbitration
agreements are appearing in nursing home and assisted living
contracts, usually presented as one signature required among many
86
to admit the resident. Such arbitration agreements affect the legal
rights of the plaintiff; most notably, the ability to be awarded
punitive damages may be limited in arbitration while a jury may
87
award such punitive damages. Providers are not averse to forcing
alternative dispute resolution themselves, but they often object to
being forced to mediation. Furthermore, under Minnesota Statutes
section 484.73, the court is authorized to establish a mandatory,

84. Minnesota law provides the following:
At the time a trial judge orders a case for trial, the court shall require
the parties to discuss and determine whether a form of alternative
dispute resolution would be appropriate or likely to resolve some or all
of the issues in the case. Alternative dispute resolution may include
arbitration, mediation, summary jury trial, or other alternatives
suggested by the court or parties, and may be either binding or
nonbinding. All parties must agree unanimously before alternative
dispute resolution proceeds.
MINN. STAT. § 604.11, subdiv. 2.
85. Id.
86. See Marmet Healthcare Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04
(2012) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts any state law
prohibiting arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts and ending a circuit
court split on the issue). See generally Suzanne M. Scheller, Arbitrating Wrongful
Death Claims for Nursing Home Patients: What is Wrong with this Picture and How to
Make it “More” Right, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 527 (2008).
87. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (providing guidance on punitive damages).
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88

non-binding arbitration system.
While certain claims are
excluded, medical malpractice is not excluded:
Judicial arbitration may not be used to dispose of matters
relating to guardianship, conservatorship, or civil
commitment, matters within the juvenile court
jurisdiction involving children in need of protection or
services or delinquency, matters involving termination of
parental rights under sections 260C.301 to 260C.328, or
matters arising under sections 518B.01, 626.557, or
89
144.651 to 144.652.
Particularly due to the increased use by providers of predispute, binding arbitration agreements, the court should view
ordering mediation as a means to level the playing field and should
not allow providers to pick and choose when they wish to engage in
a non-binding alternative dispute resolution process such as
mediation. After all, the law does not force resolution at mediation.
I.

Notification of Subrogation Interest Without Knowing Final Interest
The need to notify Medicare of a possible subrogation interest,
and yet not knowing the final interest until after settlement
90

Virtually every elderly client has Medicare health insurance.
As with any health insurance company, a plaintiff’s attorney must
notify Medicare of the liability claim to determine any subrogation
interest that needs to be paid back to Medicare. The rationale is
that, if Medicare paid a medical bill on behalf of a beneficiary and
the medical bill was incurred as a result of injury due to the
negligence of another, Medicare is owed the payments made. The
process for reporting, receiving related charges, and ultimately
determining a final demand amount is complex and timeconsuming. The most challenging piece in the process is not
knowing the final amount of the Medicare subrogation interest
until after settlement. This lack of knowledge makes it very difficult
at times to get the client’s authority to settle the claim because they
are unsure how much will need to be paid to Medicare. Estimates
of the subrogation interest are available before settlement, but

88. Id. § 484.73, subdiv. 1.
89. Id. § 484.73, subdiv. 2.
90. Medicare health insurance is available to those ages sixty-five or older. See
42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) (2014).
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Medicare reserves the right to add to the estimate up until the
request for the final demand amount, which has indeed happened
91
on numerous occasions. Defendants routinely make proof of
satisfaction of the Medicare subrogation interest a term of any
settlement due to their own legal obligations when it comes to
reporting a liability claim.
J.

Claimant Not Receiving Benefit of Recent Case Law
A claimant not receiving the benefit of recent case law that
indicates that any award not be reduced by the amount of
Medicare subrogation payments.

Injury claims where the claimant is an elderly client involve
Medicare. Medicare makes payments related to the injury claimed
on behalf of the claimant but often writes off between 50% and
75% of the bill. This means that if the hospital billed $50,000 in
care related to the injury, Medicare may pay $25,000 and write off
$25,000, meaning simply not paying the remaining $25,000 and not
allowing the patient to be billed for that amount, resulting in the
hospital simply adjusting their bill to $25,000, the amount paid by
Medicare. Payments made by health insurance companies related
to the injury on behalf of the claimant are generally called
92
“collateral source” payments. If the claim went to trial, the jury
would hear about the full amount of any medical bills, not the
93
amount of payments by a collateral source. The collateral source
payments are only presented in a post-trial motion to request a
reduction of any award based on an offset for collateral source
94
payments. However, related payments made by Medicare are not
considered collateral source payments because they are payments
made under the Social Security Act pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
91. In this author’s experience, the amounts added by Medicare to the final
demand amount, over and above Medicare’s estimate, range from hundreds to
thousands of dollars.
92. MINN. STAT. § 548.251, subdiv. 1.
93. Id. § 548.251, subdiv. 5.
94. Id. § 548.251, subdiv. 2. The theory is that a plaintiff should not be
allowed double recovery, meaning if a medical bill related to an injury totaled
$1,000 and the health insurance company paid $800 (and wrote off $200), any jury
award may be reduced by the court to $800, or the amount of the collateral source
payment, offset by the amount in health insurance premiums for the two years
prior to the injury paid by claimant. See id.
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section 548.251, subdivision 1(2), and are therefore excluded.
Renswick v. Wenzel confirms that Medicare payments are not
96
considered collateral source payments.
However, most claims on behalf of an elderly claimant settle
without a jury trial. There are no post-trial motions where the
subrogation interest is revealed and no determination by the court
that Medicare subrogation interests are not collateral source
payments and that the claimant is entitled to the full amount of the
medical bills under a Renswick analysis. Defendants have an
97
obligation to report a Medicare subrogation interest. Once
reported, the claimant and defendant have an obligation to satisfy
the subrogation interest. Defendants often press to see the detailed
Medicare subrogation interest under the guise of their reporting
and satisfaction obligation. Much of the time, the information is
used to find out the actual amount owed by a claimant, and any
subsequent settlement offers do not reflect the actual billed
amounts the claimant is entitled to under Renswick, but rather the
subrogation amount. With 50–75% write offs, the ability to have
meaningful recovery is limited for the elderly claimant.
K.

Good Faith Insurance Law Does Not Provide Proper Tools
Good faith insurance law in Minnesota does not provide the tools
to keep a claim moving, such as distinguishing what is
“reasonable” in a claim involving and elderly client.

Minnesota law requires timely and appropriate responses from
an insurance company in a liability claim, such as that involving an
injury in a nursing home. Minnesota Statutes sections 72A.17
through 72A.32 regulate insurance practices and are intended to
prevent an insurance company from being non-responsive and
98
obstructionist when given notice of a claim. When an attorney
attempts to work in good faith with an insurance adjuster to resolve
a medical malpractice matter, the insurance laws are intended to
ensure that the insurance company also operates in good faith.

95. Id. § 548.251, subdiv. 1(2).
96. 819 N.W.2d 198, 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
97. Defendant’s reporting duty arises out of the Medicare, Medicaid, and
section 111 of the SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (commonly referred to as Section
111 of the MMSEA).
98. MINN. STAT. §§ 72A.17–.32.
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However, the good faith insurance laws do not take into account an
expedited review or are loosely regulated without an understanding
of the effect of delay on an elderly client. Below is a sampling of
specific provisions of the good faith insurance laws that could be
bolstered to ensure good faith in claims involving vulnerable
adults.
1.

99

Demanding Information that Would Not Affect Settlement

As stated above, Medicare has reporting requirements for both
claimants and defendants. However, the requirement refers to
notifying Medicare of the claim; it does not refer to receiving
detailed information about related Medicare payments. In
negotiations with insurance companies or defense attorneys,
sometimes no settlement offer will be made without receipt of not
just the estimated Medicare subrogation interest but also the
detailed listing of related payments made by Medicare. Defendants
often want to see the detailed listing to argue that certain line items
are not related and therefore any settlement offer will not include
such line items. Such detailed information does not affect the
settlement since the claimant (and by extension the defendant) is
responsible for paying the subrogation interest in its entirety,
regardless of what the defendant believes is related. Demanding a
detailed listing goes beyond any necessary information that would
affect settlements in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
100
72A.201, subdivision 4(9).
2.

101

Not Ensuring Prompt and Fair Processing of Claims

Subdivision 1 states that rules governing the processing of
insurance claims were adopted to “ensure the prompt, fair, and
102
honest processing of claims and complaints.” The definitions of
the terms are not defined in law, particularly as related to claims

99. Id. § 72A.201, subdiv. 4(9) (providing that it is an unfair practice for the
insurance company to demand “information which would not affect the
settlement of the claim”).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 72A.201, subdiv. 1. Similarly, this delayed processing also violates
Minnesota Statutes section 72A.20, subdivision 12(5), which prohibits failing to
affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable period of time. Id. § 72A.201, subdiv.
12(5).
102. Id. § 72A.201, subdiv. 1.
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brought by a vulnerable adult. To a client with multiple health
issues and perhaps imminent death, “prompt” should be given
special meaning. Special protections for vulnerable adults and
elderly individuals are recognized elsewhere in Minnesota law,
including a public policy of protecting vulnerable adults and
awarding special damages for certain behavior against senior
103
citizens.
3.

104

Failure to Acknowledge Receipt of Notice of a Claim

Once notice of a claim is given, the name, phone number, and
other contact information of the insurance analyst is to be provided
105
within ten business days of receipt of the notice. It is possible that
the contact information is not provided for months, which violates
this section and also delays the claim.
4.

106

Failure to Act Reasonably Promptly upon Communications

Once notice of a claim is made, the insurer must respond with
107
reasonable promptness. Delays in response to everything from a
request for contact information to a response to a demand, can
take six to nine months or more. Again, given the vulnerability of
the elderly claimant and the substantial impact of pain and
suffering damages being unavailable once the claimant dies,
“reasonably promptly” should be defined under Minnesota’s good
faith insurance laws.
L.

Plaintiff Ineligible as a Result of Settlement Amount or Jury Award
The possibility that an injured plaintiff on Medical Assistance
may become ineligible for Medical Assistance as a result of any
settlement amount or jury award.
108

Long-term care residents receiving Medical Assistance
benefits must have less than $3,000 in assets to maintain their

103. See id. §§ 626.557–.5573; see also id. § 325F.71 (enhancing penalties for
consumer fraud against senior citizens and disabled individuals).
104. Id. § 72A.201, subdiv. 4(1).
105. Id. § 72A.201, subdivs. 4(1)–(2).
106. Id. § 72A.20, subdiv. 12(2).
107. Id.
108. “Medical Assistance,” Minnesota’s version of Medicaid, means “payment
of part or all of the cost of the care and services identified in section 256B.0625,
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109

eligibility. When an injury claim is made on behalf of an elderly
client, any settlement disbursement or jury award must be disclosed
110
The
to the county overseeing Medical Assistance eligibility.
question remains how such a settlement or jury award will be
counted by Medical Assistance and whether the resident can retain
Medical Assistance benefits. The answer hinges on whether such
award is considered an “available asset” to pay for the resident’s
long-term care, thus disqualifying him or her from Medical
Assistance, or whether such an award is considered “unavailable”
and not counted when determining ongoing Medical Assistance
111
eligibility.
A person over the age of sixty-five receiving Medical Assistance
benefits in Minnesota is not allowed to place any settlement funds
into a special or supplemental needs trust because those trusts are
only available if the grantor or beneficiary is under the age of sixty112
five.
However, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C), a
disabled person of any age may place funds in a pooled trust as an
113
excluded asset not counted in Medical Assistance eligibility.
for eligible individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet all of
this cost.” Id. § 256B.02, subdiv. 8.
109. See MINN. DEP’T. OF HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS MANUAL ch.
19.05 (2015) [hereinafter HCPM], http://hcopub.dhs.state.mn.us/hcpmsrc
/19_05.htm.
110. See MINN. STAT. § 256B.056, subdiv. 9(c)(3).
111. See generally id. § 256B.056 (discussing eligibility requirements for medical
assistance and naming certain assets as “available”).
112. See id. § 501B.89; id. § 256B.056, subdivs. 3b(a)–(b) (providing
requirements of a supplemental needs trust); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)–(d)
(2012)(providing the requirements of a special needs trust).
113. The requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C) in order to exclude
assets from a pooled trust when considering medical assistance eligibility are as
follows:
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled . . .
that meets the following conditions:
(i) The trust is established and managed by a nonprofit
association.
(ii) A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the
trust, but, for purposes of investment and management of funds,
the trust pools these accounts.
(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of
individuals who are disabled (as defined in section 1382c(a)(3)
of this title) by the parent, grandparent, or legal guardian of such
individuals, by such individuals, or by a court.
(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary’s
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Minnesota has historically not recognized the federal law on point,
114
which considers a pooled trust to be an excluded asset. However,
recent litigation has paved the way for elderly clients to place any
settlement funds in a pooled trust without the resident losing
115
Medical Assistance eligibility. Because the pooled trust practice is
relatively new and not confirmed in all counties, the possibility
exists that one county may yet consider the pooled trust funds to be
an available asset and thus disqualify the resident for Medical
116
Assistance benefits. Such a finding would cause the resident to
use the settlement funds to pay for long-term care prior to
117
becoming eligible for Medical Assistance once more.
The stripping of Medical Assistance benefits disadvantages the
elder client in that the claimant may use settlement funds to pay
the very nursing home that injured him or her for care. In
addition, the required proof and correspondence necessary to
qualify again for Medical Assistance may be beyond the claimant’s
ability, and no agent or family member may be available to assist.
M. Difficulty in Separating Damages for Pain and Suffering
There is difficulty in separating out damages for pain and
suffering in a vulnerable resident.
As stated elsewhere in this article, damages in a medical
malpractice claim involving the elderly claimant include medical
bills, pain and suffering, and possibly other special or pecuniary
account upon the death of the beneficiary are not retained by the
trust, the trust pays to the State from such remaining amounts in
the account an amount equal to the total amount of medical
assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary under the State plan
under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C).
114. See MINN. STAT. § 256B.0595, subdiv. 1(j) (imposing a transfer penalty
when transferring funds into a pooled trust for person over age sixty-five).
115. See Peittersen v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 19HA-CV-11-5630
(Dakota Cty. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (reversing a prior holding by finding that a transfer
of a seventy-three-year-old woman on Medical Assistance into a pooled trust for
less than fair market value was arbitrary and capricious); see also Lewis v.
Alexander, 685 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that state law was impermissibly
more restrictive than the federal law with respect to pooled special needs trusts).
116. But see HCPM, supra note 109, at ch. 19.25.35.25 (providing support for
consistent interpretation by every county of pooled trusts as an excluded asset).
117. Id.
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damages. Given that pain and suffering is one of the few damages
available to the claimant, proving that element is significant. Yet
due to the vulnerability of the resident—the very condition that
caused them to need long-term care—the ability to prove pain and
suffering can be difficult. For instance, defendants may argue that a
client with dementia or quadriplegia feels no pain. A patient who is
non-verbal may show a “zero” pain rating in the medical records,
thus leading a person to the conclusion that the resident felt no
pain, not taking into account that the resident cannot verbalize
pain. Simply because the resident cannot verbalize pain does not
mean that he or she feels none. Residents with dementia often
exhibit behaviors that are indicative of the experience of pain.
Again, the law disadvantages the elderly claimant when using
traditional markers of pain and suffering in a non-verbal or
wheelchair-bound client. Without other available damages, the law
seems to re-victimize the vulnerable adult when he or she tries to
seek accountability for harm.
N.

Expert Review Not Designed for Claims Against Long-Term Care
Minnesota’s expert review statute is not designed for claims
against ever-evolving models of long-term care.

Minnesota Statutes section 145.682, subdivision 2, requires
that a claim against a health care provider be reviewed by an expert
who believes that negligence occurred, prior to bringing the claim:
In an action alleging malpractice, error, mistake, or
failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, against
a health care provider which includes a cause of action as
to which expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima
facie case, the plaintiff must: (1) unless otherwise
provided in subdivision 3, paragraph (b), serve upon
defendant with the summons and complaint an affidavit
as provided in subdivision 3; and (2) serve upon
defendant within 180 days after commencement of
discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
119
26.04(a) an affidavit as provided by subdivision 4.
The statute goes on to state the conclusions of the expert that
are necessary to bring the claim:

118.
119.

See supra Section III.F.
MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2.
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The affidavit required by subdivision 2, clause (1), must
be by the plaintiff’s attorney and state that:
(a) the facts of the case have been reviewed by the
plaintiff’s attorney with an expert whose qualifications
provide a reasonable expectation that the expert’s
opinions could be admissible at trial and that, in the
opinion of this expert, one or more defendants deviated
from the applicable standard of care and by that action
caused injury to the plaintiff; or
(b) the expert review required by paragraph (a) could not
reasonably be obtained before the action was commenced
because of the applicable statute of limitations. If an
affidavit is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the
affidavit in paragraph (a) must be served on defendant or
the defendant’s counsel within 90 days after service of the
120
summons and complaint.
The requirement of expert review has many ramifications for
the elderly claimant, particularly as it relates to the effect of any
potential delay in receiving medical records in order to secure the
expert review and in finding a medical professional with knowledge
of the particular long-term care setting to opine that negligence
121
occurred. This review is arguably necessary even when bringing a
common-law negligence or breach of contract claim, as it appears
tied to the status of the defendant as a health care provider and not
to the type of claim being brought.
Long-term care is ever-evolving and new care models are still
being created, making it challenging for a plaintiff to find medical
professionals on point to not only the type of care at issue, such as
wound care or falls, but also in the setting at issue, such as an
assisted living facility or residential care home. The expert review
statute accounts for filing suit without the expert review due to an
imminent statute of limitations, but it also should allow for filing
122
suit without the expert review due to an imminent death.
IV. ANALYSIS
When determining how the current state of the law affects
older adults, consider the following examples that highlight the

120.
121.
122.

Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 3.
See id. § 145.682.
See id.
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need for reform in the law to account for the vulnerability and
disadvantages inherent in the law for an elderly claimant.
A.

Example 1

Jane Doe is a resident of a nursing home; she falls during a
transfer by staff from her bed to her wheelchair and breaks her hip.
She is eighty-five years old and suffers from congestive heart failure
and dementia. She is not a surgical candidate and returns to the
nursing home for rest and rehabilitation. However, due to her
immobility from the fracture, she contracts pneumonia and dies
twenty days after the fall. She has two siblings in nursing homes out
of state. She left no will. Her closest relative is one niece who was
not involved with her care.
Some potential barriers to bringing any claim on behalf of
Jane include the following: (1) none of the existing family
members likely have standing to retrieve medical records to
investigate the claim—her siblings are deteriorating in health
themselves and they, like her niece, were likely not involved with
123
her care prior to her death; (2) it appears that a trustee must be
124
appointed to even retrieve medical records, yet securing the
consent of the siblings in the nursing home will be a challenge—
the niece will likely need to notify all other relatives at her same
125
relational level to Jane, meaning all other nieces and nephews,
who may or may not consent to appointment—and a hearing will
126
likely be required to appoint a trustee, adding to the expense and
public nature of the process; and (3) due to her multiple health
conditions and the time span between the fall and death, isolating
the fall as a reason for the cause of death (rather than her
congestive heart failure) may be a challenge for the coroner and

123. See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 2 (designating the trustee in an action
for death by wrongful act as the “next of kin”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c) (2015)
(including a list of required specifications for obtaining authorized disclosures of
medical records); see also HIPAA What to Expect, supra note 68 (stating that
authorization is obtainable but that inevitable delays in record requests are
burdensome for elderly clients).
124. See Ortiz v. Gavenda, 590 N.W.2d 119, 122–23 (Minn. 1999) (citing Regie
de l’assurance Auto. du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. 1987))
(discussing the requirement of an appointed trustee in order to bring a wrongful
death claim).
125. See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 3.
126. See MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 144.02.

7. Scheller_FF4 (993-1026) (Do Not Delete)

1024

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

6/1/2016 12:56 PM

[Vol. 42:993

the cause of death may not reflect the fall as a condition precedent
to her decline.
B.

Example 2

Frank Doe is sixty-six years old and receives services in an
assisted living facility for his quadriplegia suffered during an
accident when he was younger. He is also diagnosed with Type I
diabetes. He receives two insulin injections per day. He relies on
staff for frequent turning and repositioning as well as devices to
float his heels off the bed. He developed wounds on his feet and
could not move his feet and legs due to paraplegia. The wounds
developed gangrene, and he required bilateral below-the-knee
amputations. Frank receives Medical Assistance benefits. A notice
of claim was given three months ago to the liability insurance
carrier for the assisted living with no response.
Some potential barriers to bringing any claim on behalf of
Frank include the following: (1) because Frank receives Medical
Assistance benefits, any settlement or award that he receives must
be disclosed to the county; he either becomes ineligible for Medical
Assistance until his assets return to being under $3,000, or he
creates a pooled trust that he believes will not be treated as a
127
prohibited transfer for less than fair market value; (2) due to his
quadriplegia, he cannot describe pain in his legs from the wounds
or the amputation, although he knows that the wounds are painful
due to sensations and other factors; and (3) good faith insurance
laws state that the insurance company provide contact information
within ten days, but as a third-party claimant, Frank has little ability
to force a response from the insurance carrier in order to keep the
claim moving.
C.

Example 3

Mary Doe resided in a memory care unit for help with her
activities of daily living because of her frontal temporal lobe
dementia. She resisted care because her mind could no longer
regulate her actions. She was sexually assaulted by a staff member.
She did not go to the hospital; therefore, no medical bills related to
the assault were incurred. She if often non-verbal due to her
dementia and her low cognitive ability to process information. It
127.

See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.

7. Scheller_FF4 (993-1026) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

SENDING THE WRONG MESSAGE

6/1/2016 12:56 PM

1025

was later learned that the employee sexually assaulted other
residents due to lack of supervision of the employee. She signed a
pre-dispute, binding arbitration agreement as part of the admission
agreement three years ago.
Some potential barriers to bringing any claim on behalf of
Mary include the following: (1) because she has dementia, she may
not have a health care directive or financial power of attorney (or
have the requisite capacity to appoint one now) granting an agent
the authority to bring a claim on her behalf or retrieve her medical
128
records; (2) if she dies prior to bringing the claim, she may
receive no monetary award since pain and suffering damages are
not available to her after death and she incurred no medical bills
129
due to the nature of the injury; (3) if pain and suffering damages
prevail, due to her lack of cognitive ability, she is not able to
verbalize her pain and suffering as a result of the sexual assault and
130
the incident was not witnessed; (4) Mary would still need to give
notice to Medicare and other health insurance companies, even
though no medical bills were incurred, causing delay to the process
with Medicare taking up to sixty-five days for an initial estimate of
131
related payments; (5) the case may be appropriate for punitive
damages given the reckless disregard for the safety of residents by
allowing multiple sexual assaults, yet punitive damages may be
132
unlikely to be awarded in the arbitration process; and (6) an
expert may have little information to review in the memory care
unit related to pain or otherwise, due to the resident being nonverbal, and depending on the license of the memory care setting,
the documentation standards may be low, thus not yielding
extensive information.
V. CONCLUSION
In many ways, the long-term care system in Minnesota is
advanced and poised to meet the increasing demands of health
care for the older population. However, injuries do occur and the
law must facilitate accountability. Under the current laws, several
barriers exist to investigating, bringing, and prevailing in a medical

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See supra Sections III.A–.D.
See MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2014).
See id.
See supra Section III.I.
See id.; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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malpractice action against a long-term care provider. This article
highlights those barriers and raises awareness, at minimum.
Beyond the minimum, it is hoped that some of the laws can be
changed to better account for claims brought by older, vulnerable
adults. The current laws send the wrong message to providers that
even in the face of the most egregious injury, the claims may go
away, not because the provider did no wrong, but because the
barriers snuff out the voices of the residents or decedents. Public
policy and the principles of justice demand better for long-term
care residents and vulnerable adults.

